Procedural Formalism and Social Networks in the Housing Market by Bonleu, Antoine
Procedural Formalism and Social Networks in the
Housing Market
Antoine Bonleu
To cite this version:
Antoine Bonleu. Procedural Formalism and Social Networks in the Housing Market. 2014.
<halshs-01178230>
HAL Id: halshs-01178230
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01178230
Submitted on 17 Jul 2015
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Working Papers / Documents de travail
WP 2015 - Nr 29
Procedural Formalism and Social Networks 
in the Housing Market
Antoine Bonleu
Procedural formalism and social networks in the housing market
Antoine Bonleuy
Aix-Marseille University (Aix-Marseille School of Economics), CNRS & EHESS
November 2014
Abstract
Why do some OECD countries have high levels of procedural formalism (PF) in the housing
market? We provide an explanation based upon complementarities between the strength of social
networks and the stringency of procedural formalism. The interest of social networks is that conict
resolution is independent of the law. When local people belong to social networks whereas foreigners
do not, PF may facilitate housing search for locals at the expense of foreigners. To illustrate this
mechanism we build a search-theoretic model of the housing market. The model emphasizes that
the support for PF increases with the size of social networks, the default probability on the rent, the
proportion of foreigners, and market tightness.
Keywords: Housing market regulation; Search and Matching
J.E.L classication : R38
1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to explain why some OECD countries support high levels of procedural formalism
(PF) on the housing market whereas it generates costs for landlords and tenants. PF constrains the
landlord and the tenant to follow several independent procedural actions to resolve any dispute. PF
involves time and costs in conict resolution. Such costs are largely shared by the two parties through
rent setting. However, they reduce the economic surplus associated with a rental. In turn, this surplus
loss distorts the allocation of tenants to dwellings: rents increase above the tenantsgains induced by
PF, and landlords become choosier.
Then why do we observe political support for legislation that reduces the economic surplus?
We propose an explanation based on the complementarity between the strength of social networks
and the stringency of procedural formalism. The idea is to see the procedural formalism as a way to give
an advantage to local people embedded in dense local social networks at the expense of foreigners without
This paper beneted from the comments of participants attending seminars at the University of Aix-Marseilles, the
2013 Jamboree EDGE meeting in Cambridge, the 2014 Theory and Methods in Macroeconomics in Lausanne, the 2014
SaM in Edinburgh, the 2014 SaM in Louvain la neuve, the 2014 AFSE in Lyon, the 2014 APET in Seattle and the 2014
EEA-ESEM in Toulouse. I also thank Yann Algan, Yann Bramoullé, Bruno Decreuse and Tanguy van Ypersele for useful
discussions.
yGREQAM, 2 rue de la charité, 13002 Marseille, France. E-mail: antoine.bonleu@univ-amu.fr
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access to such networks. In such a case, PF may facilitate housing search for the local applicants. Indeed,
a landlord will undertake legal action to solve a dispute with a tenant outside his social network. The
cost of dispute resolution then increases with PF. However, if the landlord knows the tenant, the dispute
will be solved within the network instead of before a court (see, e.g., Anderson and Francois, 2008): the
kin of a tenant who makes default can be used as collateral, the tenant can leave the dwelling without
additional cost and return to the parentshome, the landlord may be paid di¤erently and violence may
even be used. As a consequence, the cost of conict resolution does not depend on the law. Thus, if
conict resolution turns out to be more expensive by law than within the social network, then landlords
prefer to rent to people within their network. This provides a strong incentive to vote in favor of high
levels of PF in the housing market.
Our study is motivated by some stylized facts. At macro level, there is a positive correlation between
PF and the size or importance of local social networks. At micro level, there is evidence that foreigners
are discriminated against in the rental market in Southern Europe where PF is strong.
At macro level, countries where local social networks are the most signicant are also countries where
PF is the highest. Following David et al (2010), we use the European Value Survey (EVS), World
Value Survey (WVS) and European Community Household Panel (ECHP) to quantify the scale of social
networks. We measure family ties from the EVS and WVS and friendship ties and neighborhood ties
from ECHP. Appendix A gives more details on these di¤erent measures. PF is measured by the index of
Djankov et al (2003). In Figure 1, we observe a North-South divide: in Southern Europe (Spain, Portugal
and Italy) there is a higher frequency of contacts with friends and neighbors as well as higher levels of
PF. The opposite prevails in Northern Europe. In Figure 2, we nd the same North-South divide with
family ties and PF.
Fig.1: Social ties and Procedural Formalism. The gure displays the correlation between two measures of social
capital and PF. Data source: ECHP for friendship and neighborhood ties. The PF index is from Djankov et al (2003).
The sample period is 1994-2001. See Appendix A for more details.
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Fig.2: Family ties and Procedural Formalism. The gure
displays the correlation between a measure of family ties and PF.
Data source: EVS and WVS for family ties. The PF index is from
Djankov et al (2003). The sample period is 1981-2004. See
Appendix A for more details.
At micro level, there is evidence that foreigners are discriminated against on the rental market in
Southern Europe. With a eld experiment carried out on the Internet, Bosch et al. (2010) show that
applicants with a Moroccan sounding name are 15 percentage points less likely to be contacted by the
property owner than those with a Spanish name. Similarly, Baldini and Federici (2011) show ethnic
discrimination in the Italian rental market. Bouvard et al. (2009) argue that people of African descent
are over-represented in social housing because they encounter greater di¢ culties renting in the private
rental market. We interpret such results as evidence that landlords prefer to rent their dwelling to local
applicants when the regulation on the rental market is strong.
A high level of PF drives landlords to demand strong guarantees when they do not know the ten-
ant. Wasmer (2005) notes that a landlord in Quebec, where PF is lower than in France, is much less
demanding guarantee-wise than a landlord in France. In Quebec, landlords do not demand more than
a month of rent in advance, whereas in France landlords require guarantor and a security deposit. An
investigation of UFC-Que Choisir, a leading association defending the interests of consumers, shows that
many landlords require documents that the law formally forbids them from demanding. Moreover, 62%
of the agencies require at least one prohibited document when they set a rent. The absence of guarantor
is also a problem in 28% of cases. Consequently, several leading websites (marieclaire.fr1 , over-blog.com2
or commentcamarche.net3) strongly recommend the use of social networks to nd accommodation.
1http://www.marieclaire.fr/,se-loger-les-nouvelles-techniques-pour-trouver-un-appartement,20297,489252.asp
2http://www.over-blog.com/Comment_trouver_un_logement_a_Paris_rapidement-1095203869-art80094.html
3http://www.commentcamarche.net/faq/37622-comment-trouver-un-logement-sur-internet
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The existence of several programs of state-sponsored insurance against rent default may seem at
odds with our theory. Why would a Government that decided to implement a high level of PF decide
to mitigate its e¤ects? The answer is simple: these policies are largely ine¤ective. Private insurance
companies that sell the insurance contracts impose very strict eligibility conditions. In the case of the
Garantie Loyers Impayés, the landlord has to prove that the tenant has a permanent contract and earns
at least three times the rent. These tenants do not default on the rent. The Garantie des Risques Locatifs
is less demanding, but it still selects a subpopulation of potential tenants who are not very fragile. In
the case of the Garantie Universelle des Loyers, the insurance is easier to obtain, but is expensive and
tenants are not attracted to it.
We proceed in three steps. Section 2 develops a model where PF drives landlords to favor local
applicants. The framework is a static matching model with an urn-ball matching function.4 Each
potential tenant sends one application for one vacant dwelling. A particular landlord may receive several
applications and will choose the most protable one. Therefore, each applicant is ranked according to
match surplus. Such surplus decreases with the default probability and the cost of dispute resolution.
Potential tenants with a high default probability have a low probability of obtaining the lease. When
PF increases, local applicants who belong to the social network of the landlord become more attractive
compared with applicants outside the network. It follows that PF increases the probability of obtaining
the lease for connected applicants, whereas it decreases the probability for the others.
In Section 3, we study the social demand for PF. Local applicants are confronted with a trade-o¤.
On the one hand, PF increases on average their probability to obtain a lease. On the other hand, PF
involves paying higher rents when they are matched outside their social network. The preference for PF
increases with the size of social networks. We also show that the political support for PF increases with
the proportion of foreigners, those who necessarily pay the cost associated with it.
In Section 4, we calibrate the model on the French 2006 Housing Survey. We there assume that
local agents vote under the veil of ignorance, i.e. without knowing their default probability. This is
equivalent to probabilistic voting. This vote induces a redistribution between local agents of di¤erent
default probabilities. The optimal level of PF is protable to the weakest local applicants at the expense
of the best agents. At aggregate level, the support for PF increases with the proportion of foreigners and
market tightness. The level of PF increases with the skill di¤erential between foreigners and local agents
when the network size is large and decreases with it when the network size is small.
This paper adds to the growing literature on the positive analysis of Housing market regulation
(HMR). As explained by Botero et al (2004), the regulation has three explanations: rent-seeking, legal
origins of the judicial system and market failure.
According to the legal origin argument, regulation of the rental market depends on the fundamental
4Since Wheaton (1990) in the property market and Desgranges and Wasmer (2000) in the rental market, several papers
(Mc Breen et al. (2011), Ménard (2009) and Wasmer (2005)) point out similarities between the rental market and the
labor market and the relevance of analyzing the rental market with a search-theoretic model. To quote Wasmer (2005) :
"Housing and labor markets exhibit many similarities. First, information is imperfect. Tenant quality, like worker quality,
is unobserved. Second, separation is costly and time consuming. The laws and regulation typically complicate or slow
down the termination process of the contractual relationship and make it more costly for rms and landlords to re an
employee/evict a tenant. And nally, there are rigidities in nominal wages and rents."
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characteristics of the judicial system (Djankov et al, 2003). Common-law judicial systems lower the need
for regulation as they are characterized by the importance of decision-making by juries, independent
judges, and the emphasis on judicial discretion as opposed to code in civil law countries. However, these
di¤erences explain only about 40% of regulation variation between these countries. Our paper takes a
complementary approach based upon the complementarity between the strength of social network and
the stringency of housing market regulation.
The market failure argument analyses HMR as a way of improving welfare in the context of market
imperfection. Transposing labor market arguments, Alesina et al (2010) argue that HMR is a way to
reduce the monopsony power of the landlords in a context of depressed rental o¤ers. People with strong
family ties like to live near their family and moving away from home is costly. Thus, individuals with
strong family ties rationally choose regulated labor markets to avoid moving and limiting the monopsony
power of rms. We adopt a similar view: people with strong family ties/social network rationally demand
high levels of regulation. However, we present a di¤erent approach where PF enables local people to get
ahead of foreigners.
The rent seeking argument analyses HMR as a way to maximize the welfare of insiders who benet from
more secure leases. When the regulation is strong, landlords have greater di¢ culties in evicting tenants
who fail to pay the rent. This protects insiders at the expense of outsiders. Desgranges and Wasmer
(2000) and Wasmer (2005) show that the legislation on the rental market can generate discrimination
and some problems between people outside the housing market (outsiders) and people who already rent
(insiders). Our paper identies a di¤erent class of insiders: would-be tenants who benet from a dense
social network.
Finally, our paper contributes in presenting another aspect of social networks in search-theoretic
models. In our paper, applicants with dense social networks get ahead of other applicants in the rental
queue. In the search literature (Calvo-Armengol and Zenou, 2005, Calvo-Armengol and Jackson, 2007,
Galenianos, 2013, Mayer, 2011), social networks open a new ticket window or queue. Indeed, in these
papers focusing on the labor market, workers have two channels to nd a job: a traditional channel
(newspapers, work center) and an informal one based on social networks. The rm hires the rst worker
who shows up, and favoritism is absent from the picture. In place of this, in our paper, there is a single
queue for each rental, and belonging to the landlords social network improves ones ranking in the queue.
2 The model
We introduce a search-theoretic model that denes the probability of obtaining a lease for foreign and
local applicants according to the level of PF and the size of social network. We choose an urn-ball model
because it provides an easy means to ensure that the landlords compare potential tenants. We consider
a static economy peopled by M landlords, L local applicants and F foreign applicants. We note F = Tx
and L = T (1 x) where T is the number of potential tenants and x 2 [0; 1=2]. Among theM landlords, V
have a rental. Applicants di¤er in default probability , which is distributed according to the cumulative
distribution function H on the support [0; ]. A defaulting agent does not pay the rent.
Local agents are embedded in local social networks whereas foreigners are not. Each local agent knows
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N landlords. The only interest of the social network is that conict resolution does not depend on law.
A landlord evicting a defaulting tenant pays Dn if the pair belongs to the same social network and Dm if
not. Signicantly, PF only a¤ects Dm.
The probability that a given landlord has an available rental is V=M . As a local agent knows N
landlords, the probability that he knows a landlord who has a rental is
n = 1 

1  V
M
N
. (1)
The probability n increases with V and N . Hereafter, we refer to n as the network size. With probability
n the local agent learns that a landlord in his social network rents a dwellings and applies as a connected
agent. With complementary probability 1 n, this is not the case and the agent applies as an anonymous
agent. Foreigners have no social network and always apply as anonymous agents.
The timing is as follows:
1. All potential applicants send an application for one vacant dwelling.
2. Landlords, when facing several applicants, choose the most lucrative one.
3. The rent is the result of a bargaining process between the landlord and the tenant.
The model is solved by backward induction. In stages 2 and 3, we assume that landlords observe the
default probability. This probability certainly has an unobserved component. However, it is typically
related to the labor contract, the sector of occupation, and the wage. As already seen in the Introduction,
landlords do not hesitate to require such information.
Stage 1: Bargaining step.
A tenant of type i = n is connected, while a tenant of type i = m is anonymous. The rent is R and
the opportunity cost of rental is C. A landlord accepting a type-i tenant obtains the expected payo¤:
R (1  )  Di + C. (2)
The tenant obtains the expected payo¤:
( R) (1  ) . (3)
With probability 1  , the tenant pays the rent R and enjoys housing consumption . With probability
, he does not pay the rent and is evicted. Housing consumption is then normalized to zero. Therefore,
a match between a type-i tenant and a landlord generates the following match surplus
Si = (1  ) (  C)  Di. (4)
The surplus generated by an anonymous match depends on PF, whereas the surplus created by a con-
nected match does not. Both Sn and Sm negatively depend on the default probability  and on the
default cost Di, i.e.
dSi
d
=      C +Di < 0; (5)
dSi
dDi
=   < 0: (6)
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The rent results from Nash bargaining between the landlord and the tenant:
max
R
(( R) (1  ))  R (1  )  Di + C   C1  , (7)
where  is the bargaining power of tenants. Hence, a landlord and a type-i tenant negotiate the following
rent:
Ri =
Di + C (1  ) + (1  ) (1  )
(1  ) . (8)
The expected landlords income is
Y i = C + (1  )Si (9)
= C + (1  ) (1  ) (  C)  Di .
The expected income Y i depends on the match surplus Si. Hence, Y i is negatively a¤ected by the
default rate  and by the cost of dispute resolution Di. At given default probability , a landlord prefers
a connected match to an anonymous match if and only if Dn < Dm. Moreover, if the expected income
is lower than the rental opportunity cost C, landlords prefer not to rent. Therefore, we deduce two
threshold values of the default probability above which landlords prefer not to rent:
i =
  C
  C +Di . (10)
Then, PF can exclude some tenants from the market, thereby reducing the rental market size. To simplify
our analysis, we assume that all agents have a default probability  below the two threshold values n
and m. Appendix D investigates the case where some agents may have  > m.
Step 2: Selection
Each potential tenant sends an application to one landlord. Hence, a landlord may receive several
applications, of which some come from connected agents while others come from anonymous agents.
When comparing a connected and an anonymous agent, the landlord chooses the connected applicant if
and only if Y ni  Y mj , that is j  i( C+D
n)
 C+Dm . When both agents have the same type, the landlord
chooses the agent with the lowest default probability.
To compute the probability for an applicant obtaining a lease, we dene the distribution of landlords
expected income:
G(y) = Pr[i = n] Pr[Y n  y] + Pr[i = m] Pr[Y m  y], (11)
where
Pr[i = n] = n(1  x) and Pr[i = m] = 1  n(1  x). (12)
The function G(y) is the probability that the tenant pays less than the expected income y. This covers
two cases according to agent types. In the case of a connected match, the expected income is Y n. The
probability that another applicant, randomly selected, pays less than Y n is
G(Y n) = n(1  x) (1 H ()) + (1  n(1  x))

1 H

 (  C +Dn)
  C +Dm

. (13)
Indeed, for a connected agent, the probability of being the best applicant is equal to:
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- The probability of having the lowest default probability 1   H () if the other applicant is also
connected or
- The probability that Y n is larger than Y m, i.e. Pr[Y m  Y n] = 1  H

( C+Dn)
 C+Dm

, if the other
applicant is anonymous.
Similarly, if a landlord is anonymously matched, the expected income is Y m. The probability that
another individual pays less than Y m is
G(Y m) = n(1  x)

1 H

 (  C +Dm)
  C +Dn

+ (1  n(1  x)) (1 H ()) . (14)
Consider a type-i agent who sends an application to one of the landlords. This landlord can receive up
to T  1 other applications. Our agent obtains the lease if he is the best applicant. Hence, the probability
to get the lease is
Pi =
T 1X
t=0
(T   1)!
t!(T   1  t)!

1
V
t
1  1
V
T 1 t
G(Y i)t, (15)
where 1=V is the probability of sending an application to one particular landlord. When V and T tend
to innity, we have:
Pi = e
  TV (1 G(Y i)). (16)
The probability of getting a lease is negatively a¤ected by the default probability. Indeed, probabilities
Pn and Pm are decreasing in :
dPn
d
=  

n
T (1  x)
V
h () +
  C +Dn
  C +Dmh

 (  C +Dn)
  C +Dm

(1  n(1  x)) T
V

Pn  0, (17)
dPm
d
=  

n
T (1  x)
V
  C +Dm
  C +Dn h

 (  C +Dm)
  C +Dn

+
T
V
(1  n(1  x))h ()

Pm  0. (18)
Therefore, agents with high default probability have fewer chances of obtaining a rental.
PF changes the ranking of applicants. Indeed, PF has opposite e¤ects on Pn and Pm. On the one
hand, we have
dPm
dDm
=  nT (1  x)
V

  c+Dnh

 (  C +Dm)
  C +Dn

Pm  0. (19)
The impact of PF on the probability Pm is negative for almost all  and network sizes n. The impact is
null only for agents with  = 0 (they never default), or  =  (all the other agents are preferred to them),
or when there is no network n = 0.
On the other hand, when people are connected, we have
dPn
dDm
=
T
V
(1  n(1  x))  (  C +D
n)
(  C +Dm)2h

 (  C +Dn)
  C +Dm

Pn  0. (20)
The impact of PF on the probability Pn is strictly positive for all  and for all network size n di¤ering
from 0. Thus, PF increases the chances of getting the lease for connected applicants.
To summarize, PF allows connected applicants to be better ranked in rental queues. PF a¤ects
foreigners and local agents very di¤erently as a result.
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3 Impact of procedural formalism
The present section studies the expected payo¤s of applicants as functions of PF and the size of social
network.
A foreign applicant has no social network. Hence, the foreigners expected utility is the product of
the probability Pm and the match surplus Sm weighted by the bargaining power :
Uf = S
mPm =  [(1  ) (  C)  Dm]Pm. (21)
The foreigners expected utility decreases with the default probability . Indeed, as seen before, both the
probability Pm and the match surplus Sm decrease with .
The previous Section establishes that Sm and Pm are negatively a¤ected by the regulation when 
belongs to
 
0; 

and n 6= 0. Otherwise, the impact of the regulation on the expected utility is null.
Therefore, the impact of PF on the foreigners expected utility is negative or null:
dUf
dDm
=
dSm
dDm
Pm +
dPm
dDm
Sm  0. (22)
PF has two negative impacts. Firstly, it is more di¢ cult for foreigners to be selected because they become
more costly to evict than connected agents. Secondly, PF decreases the match surplus. The bargained
rent is higher to balance the landlordslosses when a tenant fails to pay the rent. The magnitude of such
e¤ects increases with the default probability. Foreign applicants with a default probability equal to zero
are not a¤ected by the regulation.
A local applicants expected utility is a little more sophisticated because local applicants are embedded
in social networks. They can be connected as well as anonymous. With probability 1 n, a local applicant
is anonymous and has the same expected utility as a foreign applicant. However, with probability n, he
is connected and his expected utility is:
Ul = (1  n)Pm [(1  ) (  C)  Dm] + nPn [(1  ) (  C)  Dn] (23)
= (1  n)SmPm + nPnSn.
PF has an ambiguous impact on Ul:
dUl
dDm
= (1  n)

dSm
dDm
Pm +
dPm
dDm
Sm

+ nSn
dPn
dDm
. (24)
When the tenant is anonymously matched, PF has a negative impact on his expected utility. Indeed, the
regulation decreases both the match surplus Sm and the probability of obtaining a lease Pm. But when
the local tenant is connected, PF increases his expected utility. Indeed, PF does not impact the match
surplus Sn and increases the probability of obtaining a lease Pn.
An increase in PF increase a local applicants expected utility whennSn dPndDm
 > (1  n) dSmdDmPm + dPmdDmSm
 . (25)
We can deduce the following result.
Proposition 1 PF increases the average probability of getting a lease for local applicants.
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Proof. We know that potential tenants have a default probability between zero and . Therefore, we
can dene the average probability of obtaining a lease for foreign and local applicants as follows:
Pf =
Z
0
Pmh () d, (26)
Pl = n
Z
0
Pnh () d + (1  n)
Z
0
Pmh () d. (27)
Moreover, we know that
(1  x) Pl + x Pf = constant, (28)
because the number of applications is xed. Furthermore, we know that dPm=dDm  0. We can deduce
from equation (26) that d Pf=dDm  0. Finally, from this latter statement and equation (28) we can
deduce that d Pl=dDm  0.
Thus agents are confronted by a trade-o¤between the probability of obtaining a lease and the rent. On
the one hand, PF decreases the match surplus when the tenant is anonymously matched (dSm=dDm < 0).
On the other hand, Proposition 1 tells that, on average, PF increases the probability of obtaining a lease.
The average local applicants expected utility Ul is dened by
U l =
Z
0
Ulh()d. (29)
We can deduce the following result.
Proposition 2 There exist n1 and n2, n1  n2, such that
i) if n  n1, then d Ul=dDm < 0 for all Dm  0;
ii) if n  n2, then d Ul=dDm > 0 for all Dm  0.
Proof. i) As d Ul=dDm is continuous in n and lim
n !0
d Ul=dD
m < 0 for all Dm  0, there exists n1 such
that for n < n1 we have(1  n)
Z
0

 Pm + dPm
dDm
Sm

h()d
 >
n
Z
0
Sn
dPn
dDm
h()d
 . (30)
ii) As d Ul=dDm is continuous in n and lim
n !1
d Ul=dD
m > 0 for all Dm  0, there exists n2 such that
for n > n2 we have(1  n)
Z
0

 Pm + dPm
dDm
Sm

h()d
 <
n
Z
0
Sn
dPn
dDm
h()d
 . (31)
When the size of social networks is small, local agents do not want to regulate the rental market (part
i). Indeed, PF has little impact on the probability of obtaining a lease, but strongly decreases the match
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surplus. Conversely, if the size of social network is large, local agents want to regulate the market (part
ii). Asking for high level of PF enables the local applicants to considerably increase their probability of
getting a lease with little impact on match surplus. Note that Proposition 2 does not tell what happens
when n belongs to (n1; n2). Indeed, the social network has two di¤erent e¤ects on d Ul=dDm of which the
total e¤ect is ambiguous and depends on G(y):
d2 Ul
dDmdn
=  
Z
0

 Pm + dPm
dDm
Sm

h()d + 
Z
0
Sn
dPn
dDm
h()d (32)
+(1  n)
Z
0

  dPm
dn
+
d2Pm
dDmdn
Sm

h()d + n
Z
0
Sn
d2Pn
dDmdn
h()d .
When n increases, a local agent is more likely to be connected than anonymously matched. Thus the
rst e¤ect is positive:
 
Z
0

 Pm + dPm
dDm
Sm

h()d + 
Z
0
Sn
dPn
dDm
h()d > 0. (33)
However, the size of social networks increases for all local applicants. This second e¤ect is ambiguous
on d Ul=dDm:
(1  n)
Z
0

  dPm
dn
+
dPm
dDmdn
Sm

h()d + n
Z
0
Sn
dPn
dDmdn
h()d. (34)
Indeed, it decreases the positive e¤ect of the regulation on the local probability of obtaining a lease Pn:
d2Pn
dDmdn
=
 
T
V
 (  C +Dn)
(  C +Dm)2h

 (  C +Dn)
  C +Dm

Pn
!
:

  (1  x) + (1  n (1  x)) L
V

H

 (  C +Dn)
  C +Dm

 H ()

 0, (35)
and has an ambiguous impact on dPm=dDm:
d2Pm
dDmdn
=
T (1  x)
V

  c+Dnh

 (  C +Dm)
  C +Dn

Pm
:

 1  nL
V

H () H

 (  C +Dm)
  C +Dn

. (36)
Therefore, the total result of the two e¤ects highlighted in equations (33) and (34) is ambiguous and
prevents us from concluding that d Ul=dDm is monotonically increasing in n.
To highlight the di¤erent mechanisms seen above, the following section calibrates our model on French
data. The objective is to determine the level of PF that maximizes the local agentswell-being.
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4 Which level of regulation?
The present concern is the positive analysis of PF. It always has a negative impact on foreigners. However,
foreigners are less numerous than local agents and, in any case, do not vote. Therefore, we focus on local
agents. The objective is to determine how the social network size n and the distribution function G(y)
shape the preferred level of PF. We assume that local agents vote under the veil of ignorance, i.e. without
knowing their default probability. The default probability is then revealed when the landlord and the
potential tenant meet on the rental market. This assumption is equivalent to probabilistic voting when
the weight attributed to foreigners is zero and the weight for the di¤erent local agents is equal to their
demographic size. Moreover, the vote under the veil of ignorance catches the cohesion among local agents.
We calibrate the model on the French 2006 Housing Survey. We then maximize equation (29).
4.1 Parameterization
We normalize  to 1 without loss of generality. To set C, we suppose that if the market were without
friction, C would be close to . Thus we simulate the model with three values of C = 0:25, 0:5 and 0:75.
We present in the main text the results with C equal to 0:5 whereas the results with C equal to 0:25 and
0:75 lie in Appendix C. The choice of  does not matter (see equation 25). Thus, we set  = 0:5. The
random variable  is uniformly distributed. We leave n free between 0 and 1, in order to see the impact
of the social network on the demand for PF.
From the Housing Survey we nd there are in France 31; 300; 000 dwellings, 9; 140; 000 local tenants
L and 1; 435; 000 foreign tenants F . We set M = 31; 300; 000. The local tenants are tenants of French
nationality and the foreigners are all the others. In line with the model, we assume that foreigners do
not know any landlord.
We also nd that there are 2; 000; 000 vacant dwellings. From these data we can deduce the number
of rentals V in our model with the following equation:
V e 
10;575;000
V = 2; 000; 000. (37)
The probability that a landlord receives an application is 1=V . However, as there are T potential tenants,
the probability of a landlord not receiving any application is (1  1=V )T . When T and V are su¢ ciently
large, this probability is e 
T
V . Then, given that there are 2; 000; 000 vacant dwellings and 10; 575; 000
tenants in the French rental market, we can deduce from (37) that V = 7; 783; 000. To study the impact
of market tightness on the demand for PF, we also set V to 10; 575; 000 so that V = L and to 12; 575; 000
to cover a case where V > L.
From Djankov et al (2003), we have information to estimate the cost of conict resolution. Appendix
B shows a positive correlation between their PF index and the number of days required to evict a tenant
who does not pay the rent. Therefore, we can estimate the cost of conict resolution as the product of the
opportunity cost of housing C by the number of months necessary to evict a tenant who does not pay the
rent, nbmonths. Thus Dm = C  nbmonths, where nbmonths 2 [0; 32], as the maximum number of months
observed in Europe is 32. By principle, Dn does not depend on the law. Implicitly, we suggest a low cost
Dn in the countries where the social network is large because people have strong family/friendship ties.
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Hence, Dn is the product of the opportunity cost C by nbmin, the minimum number of months necessary
for tenant eviction. Thus Dn = C  nbmin.
The resulting Dm varies between 0 and 24 and Dn between 0:5 and 1:5. Finally given the possible
values of parameters , C and Dm,  belongs to [0; 0:01]. Indeed according to the threshold value m
(see equation (10)),   1 0:751 0:75+0:7532 ' 0:01.
P a r am e t e r s L F V  C  n Dm Dn 
B a s e l in e 9140 1435 7783 1 0:5 0:5 [0; 1] [0; 16:5] 1 [0; 0:01]
Table 1: Parameter values
4.2 Baseline results
Fig.3: Network size and the social demand for PF. The
curve depicts the argmax of equation (29) for each value of n.
Parameter values are given by Table 1.
Figure 3 shows the baseline results. The preferred level of PF increases with the size of social networks.
Local people use PF to increase their probability of obtaining a lease. When the social network is small
(less than 0.16) local agents set PF to 0. When n > 0:16, local agents set a level of regulation larger than
Dn = 1 and the social preference for PF grows with n. When n is su¢ ciently large, local agents choose
the maximum level of PF. In this reasoning, all people stay in the market. Appendix D examines the
complementary case where PF becomes so large that the least stable agents are forced to exit the rental
market.
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Fig.4: Individual default probability and the demand for
PF. The curve depicts the argmax of equation (23). Parameter
values are given by Table 1 when n = 0:16.
The vote under the veil of ignorance redistributes welfare between local agents of di¤erent default
probabilities. To visualize such redistribution we compute the individual utility Ul for di¤erent values of
. Figure 4 depicts the results. The desired level of Dm increases with the default probability. Of course,
agents with  = 0 are not concerned by the regulation. They are sure to obtain a lease anyway. All the
other agents can benet from PF at the expense of foreigners. However, the cost of regulation decreases
across , and this why high default agents have a stronger preference for regulation.
4.3 Foreigners
Fig.5: Proportion of foreigners and the demand for PF. The
curves depict the argmax of equation (29). Parameter values are
given by Table 1 with F = Tx, L = T (1  x) and T = 10575.
Figure 5 depicts the positive impact of the proportion of foreigners on the social preference for regu-
lation. Without foreigners, local agents set the level of PF to 0 for all network sizes. This is expected:
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local agents reject an institution that deteriorates the economic surplus when they have to bear the full
cost of such deterioration.
So far, foreigners and local agents have the same distribution of . This implicitly supposes that
foreigners and local agents have the same skills. However foreigners could be on average more or less
skilled than local agents. To account for skill di¤erences, we modify our model. The probabilities G(Y n)
and G(Y m) become
G(Y n) = (1  x)

n (1 H ()) + (1  n)

1 H

 (  C +Dn)
  C +Dm

+ x

1  U

 (  C +Dn)
  C +Dm

,
(38)
G(Y m) = (1  x)

n

1 H

 (  C +Dm)
  C +Dn

+ (1  n) (1 H ())

+ x (1  U ()) , (39)
where U is the cdf with support [;e], 0   < e  .
We simulate two cases that we compare to the baseline results. Firstly, we simulate a case where the
foreigners are on average less skilled than local agents. Then, the support of U is [0:005; 0:01]. Secondly,
we simulate a case where the foreigners are on average more skilled than local agents. Then the support
of U is [0; 0:005].
Fig.6: Foreignersskills and the demand for PF. The
curves depict the argmax of equation (29), where the
functions G(yn) and G(ym) are replaced by (38) and (39).
Parameter values are given by Table 1.
Figure 6 shows that the political support for PF increases with the skills of foreigners when the
network size is strong, whereas it decreases when the network size is small.
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4.4 Impact of V
Fig.7: Supply for rentals and the demand for PF. The curves depict the
argmax of equation (29). Parameter values are given by Table 1 with
n = 0:43 when n is exogenous and with M = 31300 and N = 1 when n is
endogenous.
Figure 7 depicts the impact of V on the social preference for regulation. When n is endogenous, the
rise of V increases the level of PF desired by local agents, whereas it decreases it when n is exogenous.
When n is exogenous the rise in V increases market tightness. This reduces the competition for rentals.
Local agents then set a lower level of PF to increase match surplus. When n is endogenous, this negative
e¤ect is dominated by the fact that V increases the probability that local agents know at least one of the
landlords with an available dwelling. This raises the return to PF.
To summarize, the model emphasizes that the support for regulation should increase with the size of
social networks, the default probability, the proportion of foreigners and the market tightness.
5 Conclusion
This paper addresses a central question in public policy: why, in some countries, do we observe political
support for legislation that reduces economic surplus? The explanation is based on the complementarity
between the strength of social networks and the stringency of housing market regulation. The interest of
the social network is that conict resolution does not depend on law. When local people belong to dense
local social networks whereas foreigners do not, PF facilitates housing search for the local applicants at
the expense of foreigners.
Our study is motivated by some stylized facts. There is a positive correlation between procedural
formalism and local social capital. Moreover, there is evidence that foreigners are discriminated against
on the rental market in Southern Europe (where the housing market is heavily regulated). We build a
search-theoretic model where PF enables the connected applicants to be better ranked than the other
applicants. We show that local applicants have every interest in the regulation on the rental market being
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reinforced if their social network is su¢ ciently developed. Hence, local agents can use the regulation to
increase their welfare.
In a second step, we show that the optimal level of regulation increases with the social network size,
with market tightness and with the proportion of foreigners on the rental market.
The present paper could be extended in various directions. First of all, in our paper, the housing
supply is taken as xed. It would however be interesting to endogenize it. Secondly, we could extend
our reasoning to the labor market. Indeed, Decreuse and van Ypersele (2012) show that housing market
regulation and employment protection legislation are positively correlated, and Kramarz and Nordström
Skans (2011) show that strong social ties are an important determinant of where young workers nd their
rst job. Finally, we would like to extend this model to two regions.
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Appendix
A Data
The friendship ties and neighborhood ties variables are obtained from ECHP as in David et al (2010).
The sample period is 1994-2001 except Finland (1996-2001), Sweden (1997-2001), Austria (1995-2001)
and Luxembourg (1994). In the ECHP, individuals are asked about i) the frequency of relationships with
neighbors, ii) the frequency of contacts with friends and relatives outside the household. We transform
answers into a daily frequency to simplify the exposition. Indeed, the answers are as follows: 1. On most
days; 2. Once or twice a week; 3. Once or twice a month; 4. Less often than once a month; 5. Never.
On this basis, David et al (2010) built the following index measure as used in Figure 1:
Zi;t = I [Xi;t = 1] + I [Xi;t = 2]
2
7
+ I [Xi;t = 3]
2
30
+ I [Xi;t = 4]
1
60
+ I [Xi;t = 5] 0
where Zi;t is the index value for individual i at time t and Xi;t the answer to the question. I[:] is an
indicator function that takes value 1 if the expression in brackets is true and 0 if it is not.
The family ties variable is obtained from the EVS and WVS survey. The question is: "Would you
consider it important to teach your children to leave your home?". The answer to the question is yes/no
and is attributed the value 1 or 0. We attribute 0 to the answer yes and 1 to the answer no. Thus, we
obtain an index value of family ties between 0 and 1. Van de Velde (2008) and Reher (1998) explain
that when family ties are strong in a country, young people, by their education and their culture, become
independent later than young people in countries where family ties are weak.
B Housing market regulation
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Fig.8: Correlation between PF and number of months to
evict a tenant. Data source: Djankov et al (2003)
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C o u n t r y N um b e r o f d ay s t o e v ic t a t e n a n t N um b e r o f m o n th s t o e v i c t a t e n a n t
I c e la n d 6 4 2 .1 0 5 3
U n i t e d K in g d om 1 1 5 3 .7 8 2 9
B e lg iu m 1 2 0 3 .9 4 7 4
F in la n d 1 2 0 3 .9 4 7 4
I r e la n d 1 2 1 3 .9 8 0 3
S w e d e n 1 6 0 5 .2 6 3 2
S p a in 1 8 3 6 .0 1 9 7
D e nm a rk 2 2 5 7 .4 0 1 3
Fr a n c e 2 2 6 7 .4 3 4 2
G r e e c e 2 4 7 8 .1 2 5 0
S w it z e r la n d 2 6 6 8 .7 5 0 0
E s t o n ia 3 0 5 1 0 .0 3 2 9
C z e ch R e p u b l i c 3 3 0 1 0 .8 5 5 3
P o r t u g a l 3 3 0 1 0 .8 5 5 3
G e rm a ny 3 3 1 1 0 .8 8 8 2
H u n g a r y 3 6 5 1 2 .0 0 6 6
N o rw ay 3 6 5 1 2 .0 0 6 6
L u x em b o u r g 3 8 0 1 2 .5 0 0 0
A u s t r ia 5 4 7 1 7 .9 9 2 4
I t a ly 6 3 0 2 0 .7 2 3 2
S lov e n ia 1 0 0 3 3 2 .9 9 3 4
Table 2: Number of months to evict a tenant in Europe. Data source: Djankov et al (2003)
C Impact of C on the demand for PF
We examine the sensitivity of Dm to changes in C. This parameter is not the most exciting one in our
analysis,which is why it has been relegated to Appendix. We have Dm = C:nbmonths, where the number
of months belong to [0; 32]. We also know that Dn = C:nbmin, where nbmin = 2. Then, given that the
maximum number of months to evict a tenant in Europe is equal to 32, we can compute the maximum
value Dm that local agents can choose. When C is equal to 0:25 is Dm = 8; when C = 0:75 then
Dm = 24. Thus C changes the scale of the demand for PF.
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Fig.9: Impact of C on the demand for PF. The curves
depict the argmax of equation (29). Parameter values
are given by Table 1.
Figure 9 shows that the political support for PF tends to decrease with the opportunity cost of renting
C. When C is large, the economic surplus associated with a rental is small. Deteriorating it with PF has
major implications for rents.
D Accounting for market eviction
So far, we have neglected the fact that the regulation can expel some agents from the market. To account
for this phenomenon, we modify our model. The probabilities Pm and Pn become
Pn = e
 L H(
 C
 C+Dn )+F H(
 C
 C+Dm )
V
0BBBB@1 
0BBBB@
n
L H(  C C+Dn )
L H(  C C+Dn )+F H(
 C
 C+Dm )
(1 H [])+
1  n L H(
 C
 C+Dn )
L H(  C C+Dn )+F H(
 C
 C+Dm )

1 H

( C+Dn)
 C+Dm

1CCCCA
1CCCCA
and
Pm = e
 L H(
 C
 C+Dn )+F H(
 C
 C+Dm )
V
0BBBB@1 
0BBBB@
n
L H(  C C+Dn )
L H(  C C+Dn )+F H(
 C
 C+Dm )

1 H

( C+Dm)
 C+Dn

+

1  n L H(
 C
 C+Dn )
L H(  C C+Dn )+F H(
 C
 C+Dm )

(1 H ())
1CCCCA
1CCCCA
The distribution G(y) is modied: non-protable agents (i.e. local applicants with a default probability
 larger than the threshold value n and foreign applicants with a default probability larger than the
threshold value m) stay out of this distribution. Moreover we know that n > m if and only ifDm > Dn.
The mean expected utility of a local agent becomes:
Ul =
mZ
0
((1  n)SmPm + nPnSn)h()d: (40)
We calibrate this model with the baseline parameter values, where we let Dm be free. We set n to 0:99
to maximize the demand for PF.
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Fig.10: PF and the average utility of local agents.
Parameter values are given by Table 1 with n = 0:99.
Figure 10 shows that the average utility increases with PF up to the point where PF starts evicting
the weakest local agents, those with the highest . Thus local agents never vote for a level of PF above
this threshold value. Given m = 1 0:51 0:5+Dm (see equation (10)) and  2 [0; 0:01], some local agents can
be evicted from the rental market when Dm  52. Indeed, 1 0:51 0:5+52 < 0:01.
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